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Abstract— Trying to achieve higher usage efficiency for spectrum 
has been on the research agenda for some time now. More efficient 
transmission technologies are being developed, but they alone will 
not solve the problem of spatially and temporally underused 
spectrum and radio resources. Mechanisms to optimize spectrum 
access over space and time are required. This paper describes 
schemes, based on multiple agents that collaborate to find more 
efficient allocation patterns in a defined coverage area. Leveraging 
on microeconomics inspired mechanisms, the paper describes and 
analyses schemes based on collaborating ‘agents’ (hat can be either 
whole operator, or BS or end user terminal)  that negotiate with each 
other to find the most optimized allocation pattern for a given area 
and allocation duration.  
The optimization strategies investigated include both bargaining as 
well as auction based mechanisms. Both allow the negotiation of 
spectrum and radio resources, based on market driven incentives. 
The auction types investigated support dynamic allocations on 
different timescales, ranging from short to medium and long term 
allocation scenarios. While auctions are discussed to be used for the 
longer term allocations, a MAC based rental protocol is evaluated 
for shorter term allocations when operated either at the BS or end 
user terminal level. Finally, the paper discusses how the MAC based 
rental protocol between BSs can be implemented.  
 
Index Terms - Anglo-Dutch Auction, Rubinstein-Stahl Bargaining, 
Rental Medium Access Control, Cognitive Radio 
I. INTRODUCTION 
EVERAL measurement campaigns [1] on the spectrum 
occupancy over time, space and frequency have shown that 
spectrum is sporadically used and consequently offers some 
possibilities for an opportunistic spectrum usage between 
operators and/or radio access technologies (existing and 
incoming). This space time varying spectrum usage motivates for 
a more efficient spectrum usage. This improvement can be 
achieved with collaborative mechanisms between the different 
agents using the spectrum. These agents can be classified into 
different types such as the end user terminal, the base station (BS), 
or the operator itself (composed of the end user terminals + set of 
BSs). Therefore, dynamic spectrum allocation can be considered 
as a multi agent system where agents can come into 
communications to collaborate to share the spectrum. Based on 
this multi agent systems framework, any type of agent can 
potentially collaborate with any other type of agent. Also, since 
spectrum varying usage over time can occur at different 
timescales (per millisecond, per second, per minute, monthly, 
seasonal, annual), the way the different agents can collaborate can 
differ depending on the timescale under consideration. Anyway, 
since dynamic spectrum allocation can be considered as a multi 
agents system, it appears that the application of microeconomics 
inspired mechanisms is a relevant approach to manage the 
dynamic spectrum allocation between the agents for each of these 
different timescales. 
 
This paper presents the latest research achievements of a major 
European research initiative (E2R2 Project [2]) in the field of 
applied microeconomics based mechanisms in support of 
dynamic spectrum allocation.  
 
This paper focuses on three types of collaborative agent 
interactions applying auctioning based mechanisms to increase 
the spectrum efficiency: “end user terminal – BS” for short time 
scale, “BS – BS” for short timescale and “operator – operator” for 
long term timescale.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section II of the paper 
addresses dynamic spectrum allocation between operators for 
long term spectrum sharing (i.e. not real time operations). Here, 
each operator is considered as a whole (end user terminals + set of 
BSs). Purpose is to maximise jointly the network performance 
(number of users supported, user’s QoS and spectrum efficiency) 
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and the profits for the operators. In this part, two economic 
models are proposed. The first model is proposing an 
“Anglo-Dutch split award auction”. The second model proposes a 
bargaining based algorithm using Rubinstein-Stahl bargaining 
model for a distributed implementation of dynamic spectrum 
allocation. This latter model also discusses the good trade-off 
between fairness of different networks and the efficiency of 
network performance. 
 
Section III of the paper addresses real time (i.e. timlescale ≤ 
minutes) and distributed dynamic spectrum allocation in a context 
of cognitive radios. Here, microeconomics is considered as an 
“artificial” tool (i.e. artificial money is considered) to schedule 
radio resources in a dynamic fashion between distributed entities 
(end user terminals or BSs) at the MAC level. A first scenario 
addresses auctioning at the end user terminal level. The second 
scenario addresses an over the air rental protocol between primary 
and secondary BSs. The rental protocol is driven by a policy based 
radio etiquette which can support different auction schemes to 
adapt to the varying environment conditions. This part focuses on 
the implementation of the advertisement phase of the rental 
protocol. Finally, Section IV concludes the paper.  
II. ADVANCED AUCTIONING SCHEMES FOR LONG TERM 
SPECTRUM SHARING BETWEEN OPERATORS 
The part addresses dynamic spectrum allocation between 
operators for long term (i.e. not real time operations) spectrum 
sharing. Here, each operator is considered as a whole, i.e. a set of 
end user terminals and associated BSs) and real money is used in 
the auctioning. Driven by the pouring of diverse services 
supported by various Radio Access Networks (RANs) belonging 
to different operators, how to efficiently utilize the limited radio 
spectrum and guarantee the operator’s profits becomes a joint 
economic and technical problem. As enabling solutions, spectrum 
rental or trading has generated a lot of interest. In parallel with 
that, recent years has seen a trend of applying microeconomics 
inspired trading mechanisms to spectrum allocation all over the 
world. In the current part, we introduce two novel schemes of 
spectrum trading: Anglo-Dutch split award auction and 
distributed based bilateral bargaining (D3B) model under 
incomplete information for dynamic spectrum allocation. 
A. Anglo-Dutch Split Award Auction 
Recent years have witnessed an extensive reliance on auction 
mechanisms in allocating spectrums in the United States, the 
United Kingdom and elsewhere in Europe. On the other hand, 
several European countries opted for ‘beauty contests’ where 
licenses were allocated via ad hoc administrative procedures. In 
this paper we consider yet another auction mechanism for 
spectrum allocation among a small number of firms, who then 
compete in the delivery of communication services. While our 
focus is on maximizing license revenues, the spectrum allocation 
mechanism we are going to propose starts from a base level 
importance attached to consumer welfare. Simply put, this means 
each firm in the downstream market will have a minimum market 
share and a monopoly situation does not arise. 
While the important theoretical contribution [3] has rightly 
placed auctions in the limelight in engineering spectrum 
allocations, not so many papers (e.g. [4]-[6]) deal with spectrum 
auctions1 jointly with technical considerations . None of these 
papers consider the textbook style imperfect competition 
oligopoly model that perhaps captures better the market 
interaction. To fill this gap in the literature, we allow for a 
quantity setting oligopoly competition in the market interaction 
stage after spectrums have been allocated. 
Our basic auction-and-market-interaction model extends the 
pure auction model - an Anglo-Dutch auction - actually used in the 
sale of the British 3G telecom licenses. This auction method is 
outlined in detail by its two main advocates [7]. Briefly, the 
Anglo-Dutch auction first selects n+1 bidders out of m bidders, 
m>n+1, using an ascending bid auction (alternatively known as 
English auction) for the right to further bid in a second-round 
auction for n licenses. The price thus rises until n+1 bidders 
remain. In the second round, each remaining bidder submits a 
sealed bid at or above the price at which the first-round bidding 
had stopped; the top n bidders in the second-round bidding win 
the licenses and pay either their respective bids or the n-th highest 
bid. When the winning bidders pay their respective bids, the 
procedure is known as first-price auction; when the bidders pay 
n-th highest bid, it is a simple extension of what is known 
second-price auction (or Vickrey auction). 
Binmore and Klemperer [7] highlighted three aspects as the 
auction's principal objectives: efficiency of spectrum assignment, 
promotion of competition, and realization of the full economic 
value. Efficiency meant awarding the licenses to bidders with the 
best business plans, which in turn was expected to translate into 
relatively higher valuations for the licenses. It is well known, 
however, that efficiency, revenue maximization and promotion of 
competition often do not go hand-in-hand; some compromise is 
expected. Both Binmore--Klemperer recommended auction and 
the auction mechanism described here follows this principle of 
balance of objectives.  
At this stage we like to note some special features of the 
particular auction used for the British telecom licenses, because 
some of these features motivate us to adapt/modify the 
Anglo-Dutch auction the way we do (as detailed further below). 
First of all, the licenses were heterogeneous and had different 
amounts (and types) of spectrums associated with each license, 
and which were chosen by the licensing authority (although in 
imperfect anticipation of the likely market demands that are going 
to prevail). This heterogeneity - both in quantity and quality - is 
likely to involve some inevitable inefficiency given that various 
bidders have diverse interests. As for volumes of spectrums per 
license, any ad hoc specification by the licensing authority would 
 
1 [8] provides a comprehensive survey of how auctions have been used by 
various countries for spectrum allocations. The survey also offers some guidance 
to related papers by academic researchers. See also [7]. 
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leave unexploited many other possible specifications that the 
bidders as a whole (or even the majority of the bidders) might 
have strictly preferred. 2  We therefore aim to disentangle the 
‘lumpiness’ of the licenses by treating spectrums as a perfectly 
divisible commodity and letting the bidders themselves express 
their preferences for the continuum of this divisible unit. We do 
this simplification by dispensing with the heterogeneity of the 
spectrums' quality; we will assume all spectrums are identical in 
that they are inputs to generate the same type of service. Thus, in 
the product market we consider interactions between firms 
producing a homogeneous good. Finally, we model the spectrum 
commodity as an essential ingredient to produce the final output 
(or service) by assuming a Leontief-type production technology 
(see [11], section 2, for details). 
Given the continuously divisible spectrum for allocation, 
rather than a discrete number of (possibly heterogeneous) 
licenses, we will consider the split-award auction mechanism that 
is often used for government procurement of a fixed volume of 
certain services and formally analyzed [10]. In the split-award 
procurement auction, bidders submit sealed bids for their 
respective shares in the service contract and the government (or 
the auctioneer) chooses the split that maximizes the sum total of 
bids. We adapt this split-award mechanism in one of the stages 
comprising the spectrum assignment problem. 
In summary, our spectrum assignment game involves fours 
stages. The government has a fixed amount of spectrums to be 
allocated. In stage 1, a given number of potential firms participate 
in an ascending price auction to win a minimum pre-specified 
amount of the available spectrums and to be able to further bid for 
additional spectrums in a subsequent sealed-bid auction. All but 
two firms are eliminated in the ascending price auction and the 
remaining two firms pay the final dropout price, earn the 
pre-specified minimum spectrums and then proceed to stage 2. In 
stage 2, the two firms submit bids for various shares of the 
remaining spectrums, and in stage 3 the government chooses the 
split that maximizes the total bids. Finally in stage 4, the two firms 
compete in the service provision market and their outputs are 
constrained, through a Leontief production technology, by the 
amount of spectrums won in the ascending price and split-award 
auctions. We call this procedure the Anglo-Dutch, split-award 
auction. More formal description of this game appears in section 3 
of [11]. 
The differences between the Anglo-Dutch auction of Binmore 
and Klemperer [7] and the auction mechanism we propose in this 
paper are several. First, the spectrum licenses in our context allow 
for a continuum of shares as opposed to a discrete number of 
licenses and this requires a different auction technique in the form 
of split awards. Second, the ascending bid auction of Binmore and 
Klemperer ensures a minimal starting bid for the eventual n+1 
 
2 This, in itself, need not be a bad thing for the licensing authority. As it is 
commonly known, given the number of licenses to be awarded, restricting to 
exogenous, and possibly heterogeneous, quantity allocations in licenses (as 
opposed to endogenously determined allocation per license) may limit collusion 
among bidders; see [9] and [10]. 
bidders who participate in the sealed-bid auction stage for n 
discrete licenses. In contrast, the ascending bid stage of our 
auction selects two firms for a guaranteed minimal amount of 
spectrums each with the possibility of additional spectrums; 
importantly, the option values of acquiring additional spectrums 
at some price do get reflected in the bidders' strategies during the 
ascending price auction, thus the ascending bid stage serves both 
for screening and surplus extractions. The minimal spectrums 
awarded to the two firms through the ascending bid auction also 
ensure that the market never degenerates into a monopoly. The 
basic principles behind Binmore-Klemperer method and our 
auction method are, however, similar - generate high overall 
revenues for the government and ensure some necessary 
competition in the downstream market for consumer welfare. 
B. Distributed based bilateral bargaining model (D3B) under 
incomplete information 
Based on the architecture shown in Figure 1 and some 
definitions in [12], D3B scheme is elaborated in this section. Due 
to the decentralized properties of RANs, trader agents (TAs) can’t 
collect all the necessary trading information, thus the negotiations 
between renting TA and leasing TA can be considered as a 
Bayesian game with incomplete information. As one of the most 
classic models in that game, Chatterjee and Samuelson (C&S) 
bargaining model in [13] is adopted for the spectrum and profit 
allocation in D3B. The Bayesian equilibrium and related 
implementation procedures are investigated in this part as well. 
1) General Description 
Chatterjee and Samuelson [13] studied a bilateral bargaining 
under incomplete information in 1983. Two players, a buyer and a 
seller, are trying to transact a good. The buyer and seller name a 
price; if the bid price is above the ask price, the good is sold for the 
average of the two prices, and if the ask price is above the bid price, 
the seller retains the good. Each trader knows his own valuation for 
the good. However, there is incomplete information on each side 
concerning the other side’s valuation. 
 
Figure 1 : Architecture of D3B for DSA in reconfigurable systems 
In the case of D3B, since renting TAs’ and leasing TAs’ profits 
depend on the earning of spectrum trading, they can be also 
regarded as two players bargaining to transact spectrum. The 
bilateral bargaining between them can be abstracted into a 
Bayesian game model as follows: 
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• Player (i): renting TA and leasing TA are two players i∈ N 
= {1, 2}. 
• Valuation of the spectrum (c, v): c is defined as the cost 
valuation of the trading spectrum per STU from the aspect 
of the leasing TA and v stands for the value of spectrum to 
the renting TA. 
• Bid and ask prices (Sbid, Sask): Both renting TA and leasing 
TA hide their expected prices. They progressively change 
their bid or ask prices (Sbid, Sask) so as to acquire better 
profits and in this way their expected prices are revealed 
step by step. The bargaining strategy is a means to reveal, 
and can also be used to determine, the expected prices of 
the renting TA and leasing TA. 
• Profits (Pleasing, Prenting): The trade takes place at the 
average of the two price (Sbid + Sask) / 2, if and only if 
renting TA’s price exceeds leasing TA’s price i.e. Sask ≤  Sbid. 
The utility functions of the renting TA and leasing TA, 
respectively, are: 
Pleasing = (Sask + Sbid)/2 – Pcost(lease)  
= (Sask + Sbid)/2 – c                         (Sask ≤  Sbid)   (1) 
Prenting = Psprov(rent) – (Sask + Sbid) / 2 
 = v – (Sask + Sbid)/ 2                         (Sask ≤  Sbid)   (2) 
2) Bargaining Strategies 
Now, the key problem for both renting TA and leasing TA is 
how to design the optimal bids or asks to achieve maximum 
benefit, relying on incomplete information about the opponent. 
Starting with the basic concepts presented in [13], a novel 
approach for spectrum bargaining analysis is developed here. 
Suppose the leasing TA estimates the renting TA will use a 
linear bargaining strategy, 
                           Sbid(lease)(v) = αbid + βbid*v                         (3) 
where Sbid(lease)(v) is the estimation made by the leasing TA of 
what the renting TA’s offer will be. 
Correspondingly, the renting TA estimates that the leasing TA 
will use a linear bargaining strategy, 
                           Sask(rent)(c) = αask + βask*c                         (4) 
where Sask(rent)(c) is the renting TA’s estimate of the leasing 
TA’s offer. 
It should be noted that the leasing TA have no information 
about the value of v and the renting TA does not know c. 
Coefficient αbid and βbid are the estimation of leasing TA (αbid ≥ 0, 
βbid ≥ 0) and coefficient αask and βask are estimated by the renting 
TA (αask ≥ 0, βask ≥ 0). As mentioned above, leasing TA and 
renting TA develop their bargaining strategies to expand their own 
benefits.  
The renting TA’s optimal profit objective can be described as 
( ) ( ) ( )1max { ( [ ( )| ( ) ]) } [ ( ) ]
2ask
lease lease lease
leasing ask bid bid ask bid askS
P S E S v S v S c Prob S v S= + ≥ − ∗ ≥  (5) 
where Sask is the asking price of the seller to be determined, 
E[Sbid(lease)(v)| Sbid(lease)(v) ≥ Sask] is the expectation (mean) of the 
estimated bid price of the renting TA when this estimated bid price 
is larger than or equal to the ask price of the leasing TA, and 
Prob[Sbid(lease)(v) ≥ Sask]  is the probability that the estimated bid of 
the renting TA is larger than or equal to the ask of the leasing TA. 
In consistent with renting TA, the leasing TA’s profit 
maximizing objective can be illustrated as 
( ) ( ) ( )1max { ( [ ( )| ( )])} [ ( )]
2bid
rent rent rent
renting bid ask bid ask bid askS
P v S E S c S S c Prob S S c= − + ≥ ∗ ≥    (6) 
We suppose Bayesian equilibrium of the game is (Sbid*, Sask*), 
which represent the optimal strategies maximizing the profits of 
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
                                                              (8) 
In the effort to receive more profits, we must determine 
E[Sbid(lease)(v)| Sbid(lease)(v) ≥ Sask], Prob[Sbid(lease)(v) ≥ Sask], 
E[Sask(rent)(c)| Sbid ≥ Sask(rent)(c)] and Prob[Sbid ≥ Sask(rent)(c)] to 
deduce the optimal strategies Sbid* and Sask* from equation 7, 8. 
With the valuation of c and v based on load prediction, leasing TA 
can have an estimate of Sbid(lease)(v) and renting TA can have an 
estimate of Sask(rent)(c). We embody this estimations into the 
functions, E[Sbid(lease)(v)| Sbid(lease)(v) ≥ Sask], Prob[Sbid(lease)(v) ≥ Sask], 
E[Sask(rent)(c)| Sbid ≥ Sask(rent)(c)] and Prob[Sbid ≥ Sask(rent)(c)] can be 
calculated, and consequently the Bayesian equilibrium can be 
developed from equation 7, 8. 
TA’s valuation of c and v should be dynamically adapted in 
consistent with the supply demand relation of the market in near 
future. To be specific, spectrum will appreciate provided that 
demand exceeds supply in the market and prospective spectrum 
demand is optimistic. On the other hand, spectrum will depreciate 
provided that supply exceeds demand in the market and 
prospective spectrum demand is pessimistic. However, it is almost 
impossible for the individual TA to predict and assemble all the 
necessary information of the whole market accurately. Instead, 
either renting or leasing TA adapts his estimate of v or c according 
to his own spectrum load prediction, i.e. with current time t, if 
renting TA predicts that his loads increase at t+1, which means he 
is in more urgent need of the spectrum, v is supposed to be in 
higher price. On the contrary, if renting TA predicts his loads 
decrease at t+1, he will lower v. Correspondingly, if leasing TA 
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predicts that his loads increase at t+1, which means his spare 
spectrum is shrinking, c will be in higher price. And if he predicts 
his loads decrease at t+1, which means he have more available 
spectrum to lease and he is eager to trade, his estimation of 
spectrum descend. Meanwhile, massive v can be statistically taken 
by renting TA as variable with a certain probability distribution 
(e.g. uniform distribution, triangular distribution) and so it does 
with c by the leasing TA. To be simple, in the following part, the 
bargaining strategies of both parties are investigated in the 
scenario of c and v with a uniform distribution. 
3) Optimal Bilateral Bargaining Strategies under a Uniform 
Distribution 
The renting TA assumes c to be a variable uniformly 
distributed in [c1, c2], and the leasing TA assumes v to be a variable 
uniformly distributed in [v1, v2]. As defined in equation 6, 7, 
Sbid(lease)(v) and Sask(rent)(c) are variables uniformly distributed in 
[αbid + βbid*v1, αbid + βbid*v2] and [αask+ βask*c1, αask+ βask*c2], 
respectively. It is obvious that the probability density for c is 1/(c2 
– c1) and for v is 1/(v2 – v1). Similar probability density can also be 
found for Sbid(lease)(v) and Sask(rent)(c). 
With the assumption of a uniform distribution for v, 
Prob[Sbid(lease)(v) ≥ Sask] can be obtained through simple 
mathematical manipulation 
Prob[Sbid(lease)(v) ≥ Sask] = Prob[αbid + βbid*v ≥ Sask] 
= Prob[v ≥ (Sask – αbid)/βbid]  
= [v2 – (Sask – αbid)/βbid]/(v2 – v1)                                       (9) 
For Sbid(lease)(v) is uniformly distributed in [αbid + βbid*v1, αbid + 
βbid*v2], E[Sbid(lease)(v)| Sbid(lease)(v) ≥ Sask] can be easily  
deduced as: 
E[Sbid(lease)(v)| Sbid(lease)(v) ≥ Sask] = (Sask + αbid + βbid*v2) /2 (10) 
Correspondingly, we can establish formulations for Prob[Sbid ≥ 
Sask(rent)(c)] and E[Sask(rent)(c)| Sbid ≥ Sask(rent)(c)] under the 
assumption of a uniform distribution for c, i.e. 
Prob[Sbid ≥Sask(rent)(c)] = (Sbid – αask – βask*c1)/[βask*(c2 – c1)]                    
(11) 
E[Sask(rent)(c)| Sbid ≥ Sask(rent)(c)] = (Sbid + αask+ βask*c1)/2 (12)  
the optimal strategy of the leasing TA can be given as: 
Sask* = (αbid + βbid*v2)/3 + 2c/3                                           (13) 
Therefore, when there is equilibrium, the optimal strategy for 
the leasing TA is to offer an asking price which is the sum of 1/3 
the upper limit of his estimation of the buyer’s bid and 2/3 his own 
lowest valuation of the trading spectrum. 
Similarly, taking equation 11 and 12 into equation 6, and then 
from equation 8, when the game reaches the equilibrium, the 
optimal bidding strategy of the renting TA would be 
 Sbid* = (αask+ βask*c1)/3 + 2v/3                                          (14) 
Hence, the optimal strategy for the renting TA is to ask in a 
price which is the sum of 1/3 the lower limit of his estimation of 
the leasing TA’s ask and 2/3 his own highest valuation. 
III. AUCTIONING BASED MAC PROTOCOLS FOR COGNITIVE 
RADIOS MANAGEMENT  
A. Auctioning between users in UMTS 
Based on the increase of computational power, capacity of the 
systems and the investigation on cognitive radio (CR), the 
headstone is laid for a better adaptation of the communication 
systems to the individual users’ needs. Parts of the responsibility 
to fulfil the QoS can be shifted to the mobile terminal. 
Furthermore, the mobile terminal is in the position to observe the 
current radio resource goods (RRGs) consumption based on self – 
cognition and environment cognition [14]. This opportunities can 
be used the mobile terminal to represent and act according to the 
users wishes and needs [15].  
The demand of RRGs in a wireless communication system varies 
locally and dynamical, e.g., moving hotspots. If considering a 
cellular network, the users in different cells are not equal in their 
urgency to phone, willingness to pay and QoS constraint. Thus the 
user differs in evaluating the RRGs to set up or improve the 
communication. This circumstance can be used by the operator to 
increase its monetary gain by negotiating with the customers [16]. 
The negotiation will take place between agents representing the 
operator and the users. The agents are located in the base station 
and the user terminals. 
In the following possible implementation of such a decentralized 
and dynamic pricing and allocation mechanism will described for 
UMTS TDD. 
1) Auction model description 
The UMTS TDD resource allocation mechanism will be 
modified in terms of the assignment of up- and downlink 
resources by one auction per frame. That is, each user has to pay 
for all RRGs carrying the data in both the up- and downlink. The 
pricing philosophy differs from the established tariffing of mobile 
calls, but it is common in data transmission. This method 
motivates the users to save resource and signalling effort which 
would be necessary because of bidding for both transmission 
directions. This additional signalling does not only produce 
additional effort, but also affects the fulfilment of the QoS based 
on higher transmission times. Furthermore, separate pricing of 
transmitter and receiver is custom in data transmission networks 
like Internet, WAP or GPRS. 
Thus, each user terminal conveys bids of RRGs for both uplink 
and downlink. The RRGs will be allocated in the radio network 
controller (RNC) subject to maximisation of the operator’s 
monetary gain. Afterwards, the auction result will be broadcast to 
all user terminals by the allocation vector, whereas the allocation 
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as itself has to be transmitted even without the auction procedure. 
The price and the allocation will be determined by a modified 
multi-unit discriminatory auction which is adapted to the 
transmission frame constraints.  
2) Determination of the Goods 
The RRGs which will be auctioned have to be described in two 
dimensions: Because of using CDMA in UMTS for the 
multi-access, the RRGs have to be limited in the code-dimension. 
On the other hand, the frames are divided into 15 timeslots, which 
can be assigned to different users. Thus, the minimal RRG can be 
one timeslot and one code with spreading factor 16 resulting in 
160 chips. Based on the application of QPSK, 320 bits can be 
ideally transmitted. After subtraction of the midamble data and 
guard period [17], the chips per code are reduced to 1952 chips 
leading to 244 bit per minimal RRG. Account for the channel 
coding with coding rate 1/3 and CRC, the minimal RRG can carry 
about 80 bits as load. The question is now if such small good does 
make sense. The smaller the RRGs are, the more flexible and 
individual the auctions can be. But the drawback is an increase of 
signalling effort in relation to the transmitted net data. Surely, a 
flexible solution also is thinkable, e.g., as long as the cell load is 
relatively small, small RRGs can be auctioned, and with 
increasing load the RRG size will increase. For limiting the 
complexity, a RRG will be determined to 4 minimal RRG. Figure 
2 shows a load frame as an example. 
3) Bid constellation 
Each bid gi consists of the number of RRGs di needed and the 
bid value pi per RRG which are inserted in the pair (di ,pi). The 
transmission of such a pair for each RRG would tremendously 
increase the signalling efforts. Therefore, the bids will be limited 
per user terminal. Each user terminal can only submit 2 bids per 
QoS class, e.g., if you consider video conferencing, then the audio 
data should be higher prioritized than the video data. Furthermore 
each figure is quantized. The number of RRGs is represented by 6 
bits which is enough for 60 RRGs as well as the bid value is 
mapped to 6 bits. For the so-called fixed signalling, a user has to 
send 2*2*4*6*6 = 192 bits. The user has to send a bid for a certain 
QoS class even if there is incentive to bid. Therefore an efficient 
signalling is proposed, whereas only this bids has to be submitted 
which are useful. The bid vector possesses in front of a header 
with 5 bits, in which the number of the following bids is included.  
 
 




Figure 3 Efficient signaling of the bid vector 
4) Auction mechanism 
The auction mechanism which will be described in the 
following is a modified discriminatory auction adapted to the 
UMTS TDD frame constraints. 
 
The set of all bids for the uplink is Gu and correspondingly the sset 
for the downlink is Gd . The set of the bids won for the uplink is 
Wu and for the downlink Wd . The allocation algorithm proceeds as 
following: 
 
1. All bids, independently of uplink or downlink will be 
sorted in a decreasing manner, whereas bids with the 
same figure are randomly sorted.  
2. The number of maximum available goods will be 
initialised by 60  
3. if r > di  for the highest bid gi  in (Gu ∪ Gd )\ (Wu ∪ Wd ), 
then gi wins, r will be reduced by di, and gi will become 
an element of Wd or Wu , depending on whether it is a bid 
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for uplink or downlink. Otherwise, the bid gets only r 
RRGs and r will be set to zero. The bid gi will become an 
element of Wd or Wu , but only with r goods, i.e., (r, pi). 
4. Repeat 3. until r = 0. 
 
After step four, all RRGs has been assigned, but the following 
side constraint has not been fulfilled: 
 
 The number of RRGs, which are assigned for both 
uplink and downlink, have to be a multiple of four, 
because one time slot can only be used for either uplink 
or downlink. 
 The number of RRGs, which are assigned for both 
uplink and downlink, have to be at least four, because 
one time slot has to be allocated for both links.  
  
The next steps will assure to fulfil these side conditions. 
 









b. )4(mod0, ≡duS  
c. 4, ≥duS  
6. If Su + Sd > 60, then go to a) else to 7. 
a. If the gain of the (Su + Sd -60) goods with the 
smallest prices, for which gi∈Wu holds, is 
smaller than the same number of goods with the 
smallest prices, for which gi∈Wu holds, then go 
to b. else c. 
b. If Su > 4, then remove the (Su + Sd -60) with the 
smallest prices from Wu. Respectively, for bids 
(di,pi) with di > Su + Sd – 60, change gi to (di - Su 
- Sd + 60, pi). Afterwards continue with 7, 
otherwise if Su ≤ 4, goto c. 
c. If Sd > 4, then remove the (Su + Sd -60) with the 
smallest prices from Wd. Respectively, for bids 
(di,pi) with di > Su + Sd – 60, change gi to (di - Su 
- Sd + 60, pi). Afterwards continue with 7, 
otherwise if Sd ≤ 4, goto b. 
 
7. Finish allocation mechanism 
In the next step the good location in the frame has to be considered. 
Because of the higher distortion resistance of longer codes, it is 
more convenient to stretch the allocation in time than in code 
dimension. Moreover, for the uplink the multi-code usage per 
mobile terminal is limited to 2. That is, the RRGs have to be 
bundle by using spreading factor 2, 4, 8 and 16. The drawback is 
that not all numbers, e.g., 7 RRGs, cannot be allocated, therefore, 
the RRGs preliminarily assigned to the users will be reduced and 
allocated to another user.  
5) Simulation 
A node B allocates the RRGs to bidders. The incoming data of 
the four QoS buffers underly a Poisson process with arrival rate λ. 
For λ < 0.2 the load increases linearly in the channel and for λ ≥ 
0.2 the cell capacity is reached. Each bidder is risk-neutral and 
bids equal for each RRG according to the transmission priority. 
In Figure 4 the relative signalling effort of frame-based auctioning 
is considered. The relative signalling effort is defined as the 
signalling data needed per auction divided by the net data sent. 
This parameter is depicted in dependence on the averaged data 
rate per buffer and user. All relations decrease up to λ = 0.2, 
because the more data sent, the smaller is the relation. If the cell 
capacity is reached and moreover the demand is higher than the 
supplied capacity ( λ > 0.2), every frame is full loaded. Thus, the 
relation for the fixed signalling remains constant at about 20 % 
which is relatively high. The efficient signalling reaches a 
minimum of 6% at λ = 0.2. This is an acceptable signalling effort, 
keeping in mind that this already includes the allocation vector 
which has to convey for every allocation mechanism. For λ > 0.2, 
the signalling effort increases, because the higher the averaged 
load is, the higher is the probability that a bid has to be sent for the 
buffer. Therefore, the efficient signalling effort approximates the 
fixed signalling effort by increasing the capacity needed to the cell 
capacity. 






















Figure 4: Signaling effort in relation to the amount of load data 
 
Figure 5 shows the comparison of the operator’s revenue using 
either the uniform-price auction or the discriminatory auction. 
The averaged revenue per auction is measured in the sum of the 
quantized prices which can take the values 1,…, 64. The 
discriminatory auction clearly has a higher revenue than the 
uniform-price auction because a user has to pay the bid. In 
contrast, in the uniform-price auction the user has to pay at most 
the bid. The revenue increase for both with higher load needed, 
because the higher the probability is that higher bids will be 
submitted in the auction. Thus, an operator would prefer the 
discriminatory auction.  
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6) Rental protocol 
This section addresses real time (i.e., timescale ≤ minutes) and 
distributed secondary spectrum usage where auctioning is 
considered as an “artificial” tool (i.e. virtual money is considered) 
to schedule radio resources at the MAC level in a dynamic fashion 
between BSs operated by different operators. 






























Figure 5 Comparison of two different auctions 
 
B. Secondary Spectrum Rental protocol between Base Stations 
Secondary spectrum usage between different operators can be 
achieved with distributed dynamic channel allocation (DCA) [19] 
in which spectrum is pooled between cells and can be accessed by 
any of the systems in a geographical area where cells of the 
different systems overlap or are neighbours. The force of 
distributed DCA is that it uses local information about the current 
available channels in each cell offering more suitable conditions 
to reuse frequency as often as possible. With this approach, the 
spectrum availability knowledge can be performed on peer to peer 
basis between neighbouring or overlapping cells.  
In this multi cell and operators environment enabling 
secondary spectrum usage with DCA, one main challenge is to 
schedule primary cell’s radio resources (time + frequency) 
between several secondary cells competing for the access and 
usage of these resources while ensuring access fairness. One way 
to achieve this is to facilitate “real time automated negotiation of 
leased use rights” [18] for spectrum sharing between primary and 
secondary cells in a distributed and real time fashion.  
This scheduling can be approached with a real time credit 
token based rental protocol [20] enabling a distributed and 
dynamic auctioning between each primary cell and secondary 
cells participating to DCA. In such a local multi cell environment 
market place, the primary cell acts as the resource offeror, and the 
secondary cells acts as the resource renter. The primary cell opens 
for renting its resources for a temporally use for the secondary 
cells belonging to different operators. Negotiation relies on 
auctioning based mechanisms.  
The radio etiquette [20] rules the inter BS rental protocol. This 
radio etiquette can be specified by the policies applied on credit 
token “units” during the negotiation transactions. These policies, 
among other things, can specify the type of auctioning method 
[21] that has to be used by the rental protocol as a function of the 
context (e.g. e number of secondary cells participating to 
auctioning, renting time duration, etc). The application of an 
ascending bid auctioning for the rental protocol is illustrated in 
[20]. The overall negotiation and transaction process between one 
primary BS and several secondary BS is preferably applicable to 
multi-carrier based systems like orthogonal frequency division 
multiple access (OFDMA) which provides sufficient flexibility in 
time and frequency to allocate dynamically the radio resources. In 
the rental protocol, the primary BS advertises about this auction. 
Provided this auction, the interested secondary BSs can bid during 
a predefined period of negotiation to be granted and allocated with 
the resources. A dynamic and iterative process is then launched. 
This approach provides the means for an adaptive policy based 
dynamic resource sharing management.  
The implementation of the rental protocol requires some primary 
BS to secondary BS communications or vis versa. This can be 
enabled [20] with the introduction of the appropriate signaling 
either over the backhaul (i.e., wired based), or with over the air 
communications between BSs. The remaining part of this section 
III.B focuses on the over the air BS to BS communications 
mechanisms related to the advertisement phase of the rental 
protocol. Some secondary spectrum advertisement discovery 
procedures are described in the case the over the air BS to BS 
communications use end user terminals as RF bridges between 
primary and secondary cells (Figure 6). 
1) Over the air advertisement discovery procedures 
The discovery consists in defining appropriate signalling 
procedures (Advertisement Time Intervals) at the MAC level 
(over the air) enabling the secondary spectrum reuse opportunities 
discovery as follows: 
• Primary cells can advertise periodically to the 
neighbouring secondary cells about their offers for 
secondary radio resource renting.  
• Secondary cells can inform periodically the surrounding 
cells about their search for secondary radio resources 
opportunities for renting. 
Additionally, the procedures also consist in: 
• Using policy based management of secondary terminals 
when these terminals act as bridges between the primary 
and secondary BSs.  
• Managing the ranking of the Advertisement Time 
Intervals to speed up the discovery in case of urgent 
radio resources need to rent. 
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Figure 6: Over the air communications between BSs using terminals acting as 
bridges 
 
MAC frame structure for advertisement discovery 
On a given frequency channel, Figure 7 describes the proposition 
of MAC frame structure enabling the support of the discovery of 
the secondary spectrum reuse opportunities between the primary 
and secondary cells. This MAC frame is structured as follows: 
• An Advertisement discovery sequence is periodically 
inserted in the data frame to support the discovery for 
two cases: 
o Discovery of the primary cells’ offers by the 
secondary cells, 
o Discovery of the secondary cells’ requests by 
the primary cells. 
• The Discovery of the primary cells’ offers is enabled by 
the usage of the Primary Advertisement Time Interval 
(PATI). 
• The Discovery of the secondary cells’ requests is 
enabled by the usage of the Secondary Advertisement 
Time Interval (SATI). 
• The number of PATI and SATI within the Advertisement 
discovery sequence can be tuned a function of the 
context (e.g. number of primary and secondary cells) to 
avoid to waste capacity. For example (in Figure 7), the 
number of PATI and SATI is the same within the 
sequence #n. However, there can be different numbers of 
PATI and SATI in a sequence.  
• The Advertisement discovery sequence periodically 
occurs every Advertisement discovery period T. This 
period T can also be tuned as a function of the context 
(e.g. number of primary and secondary cells).  
PATI … SATI … PATI PATI … SATI… SATI …
Advertisement discovery sequence # n
… …
… PATI … SATI … PATI PATI … SATI… SATI …
Advertisement discovery sequence # n+1
PATI
SATI
Primary cell Advertisement Time Interval
Secondary cell Advertisement Time Interval
M frames
Advertisement discovery period T
PATI period SATI period
Data
 
Figure 7: Advertisement MAC frame structure for secondary spectrum usage 
opportunities discovery 
 
Advertisement discovery MAC frame structure usage 
The usage of PATI and SATI is such as: 
• The PATIs are dedicated to primary BS transmissions in 
downlink. 
• Each PATI is used by a primary BS in downlink for 
broadcasting.  
• The information included in each PATI is related to the 
parameters of the rental protocol [20]. : 
• The PATIs are ranked in each Advertisement discovery 
sequence in such a way that the first PATI is assigned to 
the primary BS whose renting period will occur first, the 
second PATI is assigned to the primary BS whose 
renting period will occur in second, and so on. 
Re-ranking is updated dynamically each time a new 
primary BS is arriving. This mechanism avoids the 
terminals of the secondary cells (see paragraph 
“Advertisement discovery from primary cell by 
secondary cell ” below) to scan all PATIs when the 
secondary cells have to find very shortly some available 
resources to rent. In this manner; they have directly 
knowledge of the next available resources they can bid 
for.  
• Each primary cell releases the PATI it is using when its 
auctioning period starting time has elapsed. This enables 
new arriving primary cells to use this PATI (eventually 
after the re-ranking) to advertise future secondary 
spectrum usage opportunities.  
• The SATIs are dedicated to secondary BS transmissions 
in downlink. 
• Each SATI is used by a secondary BS in downlink for 
broadcasting.  
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• The information included in each SATI is related to the 
starting time from which the secondary BS would be 
interested to rent period opened for renting, and the 
ending time of the period opened for renting. 
• The PATI and SATI positions in the frame are 
referenced by universal time, and these positions are 
known by the “primary” and “secondary” terminals. A 
“primary” terminal is a terminal belonging to a primary 
cell. A “secondary” terminal is a terminal belonging to a 
secondary cell.  
• There are no direct communications between the primary 
and secondary BSs (Figure 6). The primary-secondary 
BS communications are performed via primary and 
secondary terminals which act as bridges as follows: 
o A “secondary” terminal performs the bridge 
between its secondary BS and the primary BS 
(provided the coverage of the primary cell 
overlaps with the secondary cell area, and this 
secondary terminal is located in the overlapping 
area). 
o A “primary” terminal performs the bridge 
between its primary BS and the secondary BS 
(provided the coverage of the secondary cell 
overlaps with the primary cell area, and this 
primary terminal is located in the overlapping 
area). 
• Secondary terminals in the overlapped 
(primary/secondary) cell area listen to the PATIs. 
• Primary terminals in the overlapped (primary/secondary) 
cell area listen to the SATIs. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Depending on the spectrum allocation problem that has to be 
solved, be it short medium or long term allocation, always the best 
possible or most suitable optimization approach has to be used. 
There is no single approach that will lead to an optimum solution 
for all cases. This paper discussed a heterogeneous access 
networks system view where collaborating agents are jointly 
trying to optimize the short medium and long term spectrum 
allocation problems. A basic auction-and-market- interaction 
model based on the Anglo-Dutch split award auction, and a 
bargaining approach based on Rubinstein-Stahl bargaining, have 
shown being very suitable for revenue driven spectrum resource 
optimization in medium and long term allocation scenarios 
involving different operators.  
Tackling the optimization problem from the end user side, short 
term/real time allocations could be based on microeconomic 
principles. Hereby the spectrum, or codes, is considered as an 
economic good, and the allocation again can be based on auctions, 
or on a rental model. An implementation scheme enabling the 
over the air advertisement phase of the rental protocol applied 
between primary and secondary base stations has been proposed.  
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